I have two distinct hopes in the event that North Korea folds

That it will allow every last trace of a Japanese citizen who was imprisioned there to be returned home, along with theri families.

And that nobody will let America gets its cowardly hands on one single inche of the country, not even as a peacekepping force.

December 24, 2004 @ 2:35 am | Comment

Oh please, not another stab at the good ol’ bad US of A.
ACB your creditability is definitely hitting the skids lately; your bias against America or Americans–I don’t know if you can tell the difference–makes you seem like some indoctrinated little puke with an agenda up your rectum.
No, I am NOT defending the US government actions, but I am getting sick and tired of people like you, rubbing their little egos and postulating their little political scenarios of historical revision, in the light of facts about the good the US has done in so much of the world, but I can hear you laughing in your own little world of self-righteousness, and I won’t go any further than that. I guess you would prefer the PRC government and their way of doing things.

December 25, 2004 @ 4:12 am | Comment

NK without its Dear Leader?

I’ll believe it when I see it.

Merry Christmas, Richard.

Kevin

December 25, 2004 @ 10:40 am | Comment

Hey Jed, did you actually read what I wrote.

Free North Korea, but don’t invade it.

Since you haven’t been paying much attention I AM NOT CHINESE..I don’t want a communist government in North Korea, I want a single democratically elected government that represents the two people’s of Korea and that was elected from within the country, not imposed on it from outside. As usual for a babbler, you have attacked me, but you haven’t paid heed to a single thing that I wrote. Attack the opinion not the person, it makes you look like a fool if all you can do is attack somebody but can’t provide an argument to support yourself.

As for revisionism, What? How did you manage to even think of that from a post that mentions nothing about history and posses no questions or opinions of any sort on history.

I don’t want to see Korea lead by a US appointed puppet government and I don’t want to see the US trying to impose its laws or culture on North Korea. I can see very well what has been happening in Iraq and how the Iraqi government is basically a figurehead for Washington.

When the US goes somewhere with a different culture or where different opinions prevail, it often goes badly. A lot of people die and a lot of damage is done. North Korea should be dealt with by a country that hasn’t threatened it or made accusations against it. Whoever helps North Korea must not be doing it to prove that they ‘were right all along’

December 25, 2004 @ 5:47 pm | Comment

Apologies for my being an ass. Such malignment and inaccuracies on my part, I attribute to too much tainted egg nog and a nursing resentment about maxing out my credit cards because of this stupid damn holiday–holiday my ass–how can you call it an holiday when you go into debt to the hilt just to appease a bunch consumeristic nimrods–shit, makes me want to move to North Korea. Anyway, you cleared up the matter, and yes, I know you’re not Chinese.
I just don’t want the Chinese moving into North Korea, and I don’t want the US of A going in there too.

December 25, 2004 @ 6:37 pm | Comment

If and when we have one Korea again, it will be Korean ran. The 40,000 U.S. troops in South Korea can go home (a.k.a. redeployed to Iraq). FYI – the South Korean government is very resistant to unification right now. The economic burden of North Korea would be a significant burden on the ROK economy. There WILL be “foreign” (non-Korean) activity in North Korea when it falls…and it will fall. Will it be China, Japan, U.S., France…who the hell knows…but it will be someone.

December 25, 2004 @ 9:35 pm | Comment

Apology accepted, Holidays can be stressful, especially when all of the spirit is being drained out of you through your credit card.

V.M Smith

North Korea is a mess right now, just like East Germany was back in the 1980s. I don’t have the answers to thins one, somebodies going to have to go in, and I hope that it is South Korea on the ground with the UN bankrolling it.

Currently the UN is supplying quite a lot of food aid to Korea and is doing it through China. I suspect what would happen is that a lot of people would move south, the north is pretty inhospitable anywhay, it is cold and hard to farm. This might make the cost of aid cheaper. I’m not against international aid, only internatinoal interfearance.

Help people, but don’t tell them how their going to change and why it will make their lives better.

I think that those in the north would be reluctant to accept help from Japan right now, they probably have worse propoganda against Japan than China does, and I have no idea what they think about the Chinese.

Presumably, some of that fortune being spent maintaining such a large military in north Korea could be spent feeding the people though.

December 26, 2004 @ 12:06 am | Comment

Hey,

Are you sure this guy is not taking time out to take his family to Disneyland?

December 26, 2004 @ 4:32 am | Comment

ACB,

I agree with the minimizing of external meddling. My with is from South Korea and I asked about this. She agrees that South Korea is actually “afraid” of unification right now with the economic state of North Korea. I couldn’t believe it came from her mouth, but she actually said that she hopes that the two nations stay separate forever! Yikes! When her blood pressure goes down (as this is the effect of this topic), I’m going to ask her if she has lost her mind.

December 26, 2004 @ 7:10 pm | Comment

Hey, ACB

Can you give us a specific example of any law or cultural value that the U.S. has imposed upon the Republic of Korea? And please don’t waste our time with Status of Forces Agreement arguments, since the U.S.-ROK SOFA is the very model that Korean forces use when deployed abroad, and very, very few people who argue it ever bother to read it.

December 26, 2004 @ 11:17 pm | Comment

Dear lirelou,

I once lived and worked as a middle school teacher of English in the city of Taejon, South Korea, as part of that country’s English Program in Korea (EPIK), which is sponsored by the South Korean Ministry of Education. I lived in Taejon for two years, and I enjoyed my time their immensely.

I am not an American, but it didn’t take me more than a few hours after having first stepped off the plane at Seoul’s Kimpo International Airport to realise that South Koreans very much have a love-hate relationship with the United States – as does most of the world, I guess.

You have asked ACB to provide you with “a specific example of any law or cultural value that the US has imposed upon the Republic of Korea”.

Well, for starters, it is well known that the US commands the South Korean armed forces in times of external crisis, and has done so since 1950. Less noticed is the issue of extraterritoriality, which has allowed Americans, for the most part, to live outside the processes of South Korean law ever since 1945, when the American Occupation began. Thus, for example, two American army sergeants who on June 13, 2002, drove a 60-tonne tracked vehicle and crushed to death two young Korean girls, were tried before a US military tribunal that refused to consider a charge of manslaughter and even exonerated them of “criminal negligence.”

You can imagine the kind of resentment this fuelled among young Koreans – in one recent poll, 80 per cent of Korean tertiary students confessed to holding strong anti-American sentiments.

I think it would be fair to say that the main political, economic, and military underpinnings for the Cold War alliance between the US and South Korea have now all been largely undermined, not only by isolated incidents like the one I just mentioned above, but also by the pressure that the present Bush regime has been trying to bring to bare on the South Korean government to abandon its “sunshine policy”.

But the US still maintains its military presence—and it is this military presence that continues to serve as the lightening rod for anti-Americanism in South Korea. It is a lightening rod because South Koreans imbue the US presence with all kinds of highly charged and ambivalent emotions that reflect their own troubled feelings about national identity, sovereignty and history. They are conflicted about whether the US troops are there as guarantors of security or as occupiers, whether they are facilitators of a reconciliation between the two Koreas or the main stumbling block to such efforts.

This ambivalence is further highlighted I think by a recent online poll conducted in conjunction with one of South Korea’s newest online news websites, the Frontier Times, which, as reported in the November 24th issue of Asia Times, “indicates that as many as 20% of South Koreans believe that the South should ally with the North in the event of a US attack, with a further 30% not sure which side they should take. Of course, the specific phrasing of the question and the manner in which the poll was conducted can affect the efficacy; however, anecdotally, the numbers seem roughly consistent with what is felt on the ground in South Korea: most specifically, the undecided 30%.”

Recent interference by the Bush regime in Washington has only served to stiffen the resolve of many South Koreans – their belief that Korea’s problems, the problem of reunification – is a problem that should be solved by Koreans, not by Americans or with American interference.

Meanwhile, every fracas that involves American servicemen, like the one I mentioned earlier, is a reminder that South Korea is not a wholly sovereign country, that the United States operates its military bases as a sovereign state-within-a-state, unbeholden to the laws of South Korea.

lirelou, I am fully aware of the fact that the US-South Korean alliance has benefited both countries, and to be fair, I must conclude that South Korea has benefited the most out of the relationship. This Cold War alliance has been based on three pillars of patronage: politically, Washington has supported political stability in South Korea, even though that has meant supporting military dictatorships; economically, the United States has sponsored South Korean development by providing it with aid, the tutelage of open economy and export-led growth, and by opening its vast and lucrative market to South Korean exports; and militarily, the United States has guaranteed the security of South Korea, the best example of this commitment being the presence of 37,000 US servicemen, to assure instant US involvement in the event of a conflict on the Korean peninsula.

But over the last twenty years or so, this structure of patronage has become almost completely unstuck. U.S. support for political stability in South Korea has become more or less a non-issue since South Korea experienced its democratic transitions and consolidation, and U.S. sponsorship of South Korea’s economic development came to an end a bit earlier than that. After the Korean War, the United States sponsored the economic growth of South Korea, but this relationship is thought by many to have come to an end around the mid-1980s, when South Korea began to record trade surpluses vis-à-vis the United States and trade conflict between the two countries became more frequent.

But lirelou, I guess the most dramatic example of the changed relationship did not come until the South Korean financial crisis of 1997-1998 (the time in which I was living in South Korea). In the moment of South Korea’s direst financial needs—caused, some would argue, by the very reckless policy of capital account liberalisation spearheaded by the United States —the US Treasury Department chose to turn its back on South Korea and instead used the occasion of the crisis to settle the old, nettlesome trade accounts that I mentioned earlier. This is a long and involved story, but the main point is that by the late 1990s South Korea was of interest to US economic policy makers only to the extent that it provided markets for US exports, which had become important as an engine of growth. The fact that South Korea was an important strategic ally played very little role in the IMF decision to “bail-out” South Korea. Quite the contrary, the desire of some US policy makers to use IMF conditionality to crack open the South Korean financial and commodities market ended up in a huge mishandling of the initial “bail-out” – once again, causing resentment and a sharp upturn in anti-American sentiment. I know, because I was living in South Korea at the time.

Finally, the US guarantee of South Korean security seems to have been replaced, as I have already mentioned, within the first year of the Bush administration, with policies that are fraught with tension and increased insecurity. It is in the context of this evaporating US patronage, that we have to understand South Korean fears for their security, which in turn feed their discontent with the US policy of unilateralism, and with the homogenising effects of a deeply resented US cultural imperialism.

Best regards,
Mark Anthony Jones

December 27, 2004 @ 1:22 am | Comment

Dear lirelou,

Sorry – just one more thing. You have asked ACB not to “waste our time with Status of Forces Agreement arguments, since the US-ROK SOFA is the very model that Korean forces use when deployed abroad, and very, very few people who argue it ever bother to read it.”

But I’m afraid I cannot follow your logic here. The Status of Forces Agreement is exactly the type of relationship agreement with the US that many South Koreans resent, and have been calling upon over the years to have reformed.

For example, at the memorial mass for two young South Korean girls that were killed when they were run over by a US armoured vehicle – the incident that I mentioned earlier, which had occured last June – a speech was made by Father Bartholomew Moon Jung-hyon, and which was widely reported by the South Korea press, in which he declared that “the US army in Korea defames our national sovereignty and commits many crimes, but we can’t do anything about it except watch because of the unfair accord, the Status of Forces Agreement.”

This accord and its implications for South Korean sovereignty makes for a serious issue as far as South Koreans themselves are concerned. The fact that the ROK military also use a similar model when deployed abroad is surely not relevant (two wrongs don’t add up to make a right), and at any rate, South Korean forces have only ever been deployed abroad for relatively short periods of time, and in relatively small numbers. And such accords, even if they are endorsed by the South Korean government, and are subsequently the model used by Korean forces deployed abroad, can hardly be said to reflect the values and moral views of the majority of South Korean citizens, can they?

Also worth noting I think, is that another source of contention among many South Koreans is whether US military bases comply with their country’s environmental regulations. This is in sharp contrast to Status of Forces Agreements in European countries that have strict environmental regulations written into them, such as cost sharing for pollution clean-up and the disclosing of environmental impact information.

I think what ACB was essentially getting at, when he/she said that they do not “want to see the US trying to impose its laws or culture on North Korea,” is that he/she does not want to see North Korea (or I would think, a united Korea) one day becoming a US imperial possession. ACB is against such unfair exploitation, and doesn’t want to see North Korea, or a future united Korea, in any way colonised and plundered – be it by the US, or by any other imperial force.

This is how I read ACB’s commentary, anyway.

Best regards, again,
Mark Anthony Jones

December 27, 2004 @ 2:30 am | Comment

Mr. Jones,
An American officer commands the Combined Forces Command, which functions only within the context of the United Nations command. He commands only those Korean troops functioning within that specific mission. His deputy is a Korean general, who in turn retains that status as regards U.S. troops within the CFC. The entire CFC staff is composed of both Korean and U.S. officers in positions of responsibility. The U.S. commander has operational authority only, not “command” in the national sense, over Korean forces. The same is true for Korean commanders vis-a-vis U.S. forces. I could spent many pages outlining the difference between “command” and “operational control”, but suffice it to point out that the entire structure exists only within the context of the U.N. command and its mission in Korea, that of maintaining the armistice. American commanders have NO voice over Korean forces outside the CFC force structure (witness Kwangju) within Korea, and zero over Korean forces deployed outside of Korea.
The status of forces agreement does NOT make U.S. military personnel immune from Korean justice. Rather it takes incidents occuring in the line of duty, as the June 2002 accident, and withholds passing jurisdiction to the Korean courts until a line of duty ivestigation has been completed. If the incident is adjudged as to have been in the line of duty, and again for brevity I will not detail all those elements, the U.S. retains jurisdiction. The Koreans in Iraq are presently operating under a similar SOFA, as they have in every other country they have deployed to. It is good enough for them, and it’s good enough for us.
I will not dispute the tradegy that the two families of the girls suffered. But I do note that those 14 year olds were two of more than 13,000 traffic deaths that year, which placed Korea as #1 within the OECD nations. They may have been some negligence on their part, but they were minors. But, where was any similar outrage over the other 13,000+ deaths? And among those 13,000 were some 350 + “children” (12 or under). Where were their candlelight vigils? Ah, they were all killed by Koreans, so no big deal. And, two more ingredients: Korea had a government that wished to pressure the U.S., and a group of active Marxists who had specifically been traveling to Vieques in Puerto Rico to observe and learn from the campaign to oust the Navy from their Vieques maneuver area and bombing ranges. And, those activists had travelled to both Korea and Japan to conduct strategy and training sessions specifically designed to exploit just such an incident. Mind you, this is all part of the democratic process, and they had every right to do so. They even published the results of these visits and conferences on various socialist workers party websites in the U.S. Thus, when the two girls were run over (“murdered” was the term used in the more nationalistic Korean press), these activists went to work with a vengeance, misrepresenting the facts and grinding their axes. And, as your post evidences, they did a very good job. Father Bartholomew’s statement is a perfect example of a priest who is either speaking out about something he has not honestly checked, or he is engaging is blatant disinformation. In other words, he is poorly informed, or he is a liar. I presume the former.

As for the other points you raised, I frankly don’t know enough about them to give you a decent reply. I will politely pass on those, reserving judgement. As for ACB, he need not fear. If the North collapses (as opposed to being defeated in war), it is a ROK problem. By the constitution of the ROK, that is ROK territory. They will likely ask for U.S. nation building assistance, but the scope and duration of that will be a ROK matter.
And whatever the hopes of the present U.S. administration, once Korea reunites, UNC/CFC’s days are over. I suspect that the Korean government will politely defer any discussion of a future U.S. presence, hand out medals to all senior U.S. commanders, throw them a large party, and escort them to the airport with effuse demonstrations of camaraderie and good will, adding that as an extra bonus, Korean Air Lines will have special “visit Korea” rates for USFK/CFC/UNC veterans who desire to return in 5 or 10 years to visit Korea.

December 29, 2004 @ 1:18 am | Comment

Dear lirelou,

Thank you for your interesting response to my comments above.

I take your point that the Combined Forces Command (CFC) functions in the context of the UN mission in Korea, which is to uphold the armistice, and that, as you said, the CFC is under the operational command of a four-star US general, with a four-star ROK amry general serving as deputy-commander. But this does not contradict anything that I said, does it? I said that it is “well known that the US commands the South Korean armed forces in times of external crisis” – which it essentially does. The CFC’s mission statement is to “Deter hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea by a combined military effort of the United States of America and the ROK; and in the event deterrence fails, defeat an external armed attack against the ROK.” The CFC is commanded by a US general officer who reports to the National Command Authorities of both countries.

Nothing I said contradicts the facts, or what you say.

I am not saying that this system of command is necessarily a good or a bad thing – my purpose was merely to point out that this is a sore issue as far as many South Koreans themselves are concerned – many of them are of the belief that, since the armistice in question is one that exists between them and their divided “other half”- that the problem exists on their soil – that it should be a ROK army general who leads the command, not a foreigner. This is an issue for South Koreans, who feel this situation to be a loss of face, and a blow to national pride.

I agree with you that the Status of Forces Agrement does not give US military personnel immunity from South Korean justice, but you need to recognise that originally it did provide enormous protection to US military personnel, and that popular oppostion to this eventually led the South Korean government under Kim Dae-Jung to insist on having the Agreement revised, just as the Japanese did – and for the same reasons – popular resentment.

The Combined Forces Agreement was revised in December, 2000, with the main revisions being as follows:

“On major crimes, both sides shall advance the timing of transferring the accused SOFA personnel to Korean authorities from the current “upon completion of all judicial proceedings” to “at the time of indictment.” If the Korean police arrest someone for an egregious crime, such as murder or rape, the Korean police will have the right to maintain custody. The Korean government agreed to the protection of the rights of the accused SOFA personnel.

A provision on environmental protection is included in the SOFA revision, stating that the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Korea will respect Korean environmental laws and regulations, and Korea will consider the safety of SOFA personnel. Based on this provision, both sides shall sign a memorandum of special understandings that includes cooperative measures for environmental protection.

Both sides shall shorten the cooling-off period of labor disputes by Koreans employed by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), enhance regulations governing stable employment, and allow qualified SOFA dependents to work in the ROK.

Joint inspections of animals, plant and their products imported for USFK will be conducted in accordance with procedures to be established.

Prior to constructing facilities within U.S. military bases, the U.S. government shall consult with the ROK government. The two sides will jointly survey existing facilities and areas in order to return facilities and areas no longer needed for use by USFK.

Both sides shall set up a necessary procedure for serving legal documents issued by local courts on SOFA personnel, and for executing rulings issued by those courts.

Both sides shall establish a new procedure for controlling access by Koreans to U.S. facilities such as U.S. military clubs and golf courses.

This SOFA revision shall be incorporated through changes in the SOFA text, Agreed Minutes, Understandings on Implementation and Agreed Views. Separate documents, such as a memorandum of special understandings on environmental protection, will also be signed. Both sides will formally sign the SOFA revision when both governments’ domestic procedures are completed.”

If you look at these revisions, you will get some idea of what the main areas of dispute were, and of what the popular issues were that had been brought about by the original Agreement, and that had fuelled much of the resentment.

Still, in 2003 we had that incident involving the two girls, which certainly caused the whole issue the Combined Forces Agreement to flare up again. I take your point lirelou, about the deaths of those two girls being only two of more than 13,000 traffic deaths in Korea of that year – and I also appreciate the fact that such incidents are often (usually) blown up, the facts distorted, by those who most vehemently oppose the US presence in Korea.

lirelou – you say that the “Koreans in Iraq are presently operating under a similar SOFA, as they have in every other country they have been deployed to. It is good enough for them, and it’s good enough for us.”

O.K. I can understand your reasoning for thinking this way, but I nevertheless think your logic is perhaps a little unreasonable. I think this because ordinary South Koreans themselves – they did not have any say in formulating the structure and terms of such agreements – be it the agreement regulating the behaviour of US forces in Korean, or for the structures put in place for regulating ROK military personnel when serving in other countries. Most of them probably are not even aware that the ROK operate under similar terms when deployed overseas.

As I said in my comments above lirelou, I do believe that South Korea has benefited the most from the US-ROK alliance – this I think cannot be disputed. South Koreans owe much of their stability and subsequent economic success to this Cold War alliance. And I know that most South Koreans are painfully aware of this. Many Americans expect the people of South Korea to love them for it, and are surprised, are perplexed by both the depth and extent of the anti-American sentiment that is felt by so many of South Korea’s citizens.

The resentment that many South Koreans feel towards the United States – this popular anti-Americanism that exists – reflects, I think, not only the love-hate feelings that Koreans feel towards Americans, but also the love-hate feelings that Koreans feel towards themselves. This is the deeper source of their ambivalence. They are a fiercely proud people, who suffer the indignity and loss of face that comes with having a divided “nation”, and of having to rely on having their half protected by 37,000 foreign troops commanded by a foreign general.

I know, having lived in South Korea for two years, that Koreans, while they are generally very warm and generous, and more often than not have a wonderful sense of humour – can also be fiercely nationalist and emotionally volatile. They tend to flare up very easily, especially if they sense that you are in any way criticising their country or their culture.

Their ambivalence towards Americans really, I think, reflects the ambivalence they feels towards their own country, and towards themselves.

Best regards,
Mark Anthony Jones

December 29, 2004 @ 7:30 pm | Comment

Dear lirelou,

Thank you for your interesting response to my comments above.

I take your point that the Combined Forces Command (CFC) functions in the context of the UN mission in Korea, which is to uphold the armistice, and that, as you said, the CFC is under the operational command of a four-star US general, with a four-star ROK army general serving as deputy-commander. But this does not contradict anything that I said, does it? I said that it is “well known that the US commands the South Korean armed forces in times of external crisis” – which it essentially does. The CFC’s mission statement is to “Deter hostile acts of external aggression against the Republic of Korea by a combined military effort of the United States of America and the ROK; and in the event deterrence fails, defeat an external armed attack against the ROK.” The CFC is commanded by a US general officer who reports to the National Command Authorities of both countries.

Nothing I said contradicts the facts, or what you say.

I am not saying that this system of command is necessarily a good or a bad thing – my purpose was merely to point out that this is a sore issue as far as many South Koreans themselves are concerned – many of them are of the belief that, since the armistice in question is one that exists between them and their divided “other half”- that the problem exists on their soil – that it should be a ROK army general who leads the command, not a foreigner. This is an issue for South Koreans, who feel this situation to be a loss of face, and a blow to national pride. Their dependency calls into question their sovereignty.

I agree with you that the Status of Forces Agreement does not give US military personnel complete immunity from South Korean justice, but you need to recognise that originally it did provide enormous protection to US military personnel, and that popular oppostion to this is what eventually led the South Korean government under Kim Dae-Jung to insist on having the Agreement revised, just as the Japanese did – and for the same reasons – popular resentment.

The Combined Forces Agreement was revised in December, 2000, with the main revisions being as follows:

“On major crimes, both sides shall advance the timing of transferring the accused SOFA personnel to Korean authorities from the current “upon completion of all judicial proceedings” to “at the time of indictment.” If the Korean police arrest someone for an egregious crime, such as murder or rape, the Korean police will have the right to maintain custody. The Korean government agreed to the protection of the rights of the accused SOFA personnel.

A provision on environmental protection is included in the SOFA revision, stating that the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Korea will respect Korean environmental laws and regulations, and Korea will consider the safety of SOFA personnel. Based on this provision, both sides shall sign a memorandum of special understandings that includes cooperative measures for environmental protection.

Both sides shall shorten the cooling-off period of labor disputes by Koreans employed by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), enhance regulations governing stable employment, and allow qualified SOFA dependents to work in the ROK.

Joint inspections of animals, plant and their products imported for USFK will be conducted in accordance with procedures to be established.

Prior to constructing facilities within U.S. military bases, the U.S. government shall consult with the ROK government. The two sides will jointly survey existing facilities and areas in order to return facilities and areas no longer needed for use by USFK.

Both sides shall set up a necessary procedure for serving legal documents issued by local courts on SOFA personnel, and for executing rulings issued by those courts.

Both sides shall establish a new procedure for controlling access by Koreans to U.S. facilities such as U.S. military clubs and golf courses.

This SOFA revision shall be incorporated through changes in the SOFA text, Agreed Minutes, Understandings on Implementation and Agreed Views. Separate documents, such as a memorandum of special understandings on environmental protection, will also be signed. Both sides will formally sign the SOFA revision when both governments’ domestic procedures are completed.”

If you look at these revisions, you will get some idea of what the main areas of dispute were, and of what the main issues were that had been brought about by the original Agreement, and which had fuelled much of the resentment.

Still, in 2003 we had that incident involving the two girls, which certainly caused the whole issue of the Combined Forces Agreement to flare up again. I take your point lirelou, about the deaths of those two girls being only two of more than 13,000 traffic deaths in Korea of that year – and I also appreciate the fact that such incidents are often (usually) blown up, the facts distorted, by those who most vehemently oppose the US presence in Korea.

lirelou – you say that the “Koreans in Iraq are presently operating under a similar SOFA, as they have in every other country they have been deployed to. It is good enough for them, and it’s good enough for us.”

O.K. I can understand your reasons for thinking this way, but I nevertheless think your logic is perhaps a little unreasonable. I think this because ordinary South Koreans themselves – they do not have any say in formulating the structure and terms of such agreements – be it the agreement regulating the behaviour of US forces in Korea, or on the structures put in place for regulating ROK military personnel when serving in other countries. Most of them probably are not even aware that the ROK operate under similar terms when deployed overseas.

As I said in my comments above lirelou, I do believe that South Korea has benefited the most from the US-ROK alliance – this I think cannot be disputed. South Koreans owe much of their stability and subsequent economic success to this Cold War alliance. And I know that most South Koreans are painfully aware of this. Many Americans may expect the people of South Korea to love them for it, and are therefore surprised, are perplexed, by both the depth and the extent of the anti-Americanism of so many of South Korea’s citizens.

The resentment that many South Koreans feel towards the United States – this popular anti-Americanism that exists – mirrors, I think, not only the love-hate feelings that Koreans feel towards Americans, but also the love-hate feelings that Koreans feel towards themselves. This is the deeper source of their ambivalence. They are a fiercely proud people, who suffer the indignity and loss of face that comes with having a divided “nation”, and of having to rely on having their half protected by 37,000 foreign troops commanded by a foreign general.

I know, having lived in South Korea for two years, that Koreans, while they are generally very warm and generous, and more often than not they have a wonderful sense of humour – can also be fiercely nationalistic and emotionally volatile. They tend to flare up very easily, especially if they sense that you are in any way criticising their country or their culture.

Their ambivalence towards Americans really, I think, reflects the ambivalence they feel towards their own country, and towards themselves. Somewhere buried deep within the collective consciousness of the South Korean people, I think, there exists a kind of inferiority complex.

Best regards,
Mark Anthony Jones

December 29, 2004 @ 10:13 pm | Comment

Good points on your part, and they are noted. 37,000 (or even 24,500) foreign military personnel in any country are not always a welcome presence, even when part of a necessary alliance. In the first place, people being human, and combat soldiers being what they are, the 10 percent “trash” element will invariably mix it up with the locals. And in the second, their presence will inevitably rankle nationalist feeling. The “Racketenschule der Luftwaffe” at Fort Bliss, Texas is a very small and virtually invisible presence. USFK’s in Itaewon is not.
As for ordinary Koreans having a say in the SOFA, they actually do, but through their government, which is as it should be. Unfortunately for those who wish USFK gone, previous agreements to reduce the Yongsan garrison have foundered when the National Assembly failed to fund their portion of the expenses.
Finally, in regards to the Korean inferiority complex, I agree, and was very surprised to note it. I have lived in Korea for only four years now, but coming here from over 20 years in Latin America, I expected a truly First World nation. I realize that pockets of third-world thinking exist even n advanced nations, as well as blindly chauvinistic nationalism (v.g., Texas), but I expected it to be confined to the fringes of society.

Happy New Year.

December 30, 2004 @ 1:38 am | Comment

Dear lirelou,

What are you doing in South Korea, may I ask?

I left South Korea at the end of 1998, and then spent a year teaching in Japan – in the city of Yokosuka, a little south of Yokohama, where the largest US naval base in Japan is located. I then returned to Sydney, Australia, for two years to resume my work as a high school teacher of English literature, film studies and history. I am now living in China, where I have been for the last, well…almost three years now.

I lived in London for two years before going to South Korea – where I once again, worked as a high school teacher.

I actually quite miss South Korea though – I absolutely loved the food there! I miss the Korean people too, though as you said, many of them do tend to exude a blind, chauvanistic nationalism. The first thing I noticed when I walked into the middle school where I taught for the two years that I was there, was all of the ROK national flags. There was a flag hanging up in the staffroom, which all of us teachers had to literally salute to every morning, and every single classroom had a flag draped across the wall as well.

This struck me as being rather scary. In Australia, teachers would never tolerate this. No classroom in Australia has the Australian national flag anywhere in sight. In fact, most schools only have one flag – on an outdoor flag pole, used only on one occasion per year: for ANZAC day memorial services. And some schools refuse to even make this much of a concession!

Very few Australians even know the words to their National Anthem. I certainly don’t, for one.

In Britain, where I also taught for two years, the same: the teachers’ unions simply will not allow the Union Jack to be displayed anywhere on the school’s premises.

So seeing all of this flag worshipping came as somewhat of a surprise for me. Many people even drape the ROK national flag out of their apartment windows – especially on their national day. All very perculiar to me, I’m afraid.

No wonder they are so fiercely and blindly nationalist.

Anyhow, thanks again for your comments.

Best regards,
Mark Anthony Jones

December 30, 2004 @ 2:09 am | Comment

Dear lirelou,

By the way, sorry about the typing errors in the above commentary: “perculiar” should be “peculiar” of course, and “nationalist” should read “nationalistic”.

I hope you have a Happy New Year too!

Best regards again,
Mark Anthony Jones

December 30, 2004 @ 2:48 am | Comment

I say let the Koreans launch a nuke and rule the world if they want. Kim Jong ILL bastard can have it. John Kerry is right, if someone wants to fight, they must be right. Don’t support the troops.LONG RULE KIM JONG MENTALLY ILL BASTARD.

The US has taken over way to many countries.

Too bad all we have left behind in these countries is our dead. When was the last time France tried to make a difference in the world… other then kill americans by giving away exocet missles.

June 19, 2006 @ 11:49 pm | Comment