(Update: I am moving this post up to the top because I think it’s important, and I insist that everyone comment on it. And be sure to read it to the end so you don”t miss the delicious reference to Taiwan as an “undented trophy.” Thanks for your cooperation.)
First, some background. This op-ed piece comes from one Lin Chong Pin, Taiwan’s former deputy defense minister and an oft-quoted foreign policy expert. I point to it as an example of how Hu is quietly using diplomacy to achieve his foreign policy goals.
On Feb. 27, President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan announced the “functional cessation” of the Unification Council, an office that had become largely symbolic. The move, however, could also have been interpreted as creeping step toward independence.
Beijing’s response was notable in its restraint. Admiral William J. Fallon, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, said on March 7 that the Chinese army showed no unusual movements. On the same day, Lu Zhangong, the Communist party secretary of China’s Fujian province, adjacent to Taiwan, said that scrapping the Council would not affect economic cooperation across the Strait.
But while Chinese officials appeared serene in public, they privately expressed concerns about Chen, as Roger Cliff and Toy Reid reported in an article, “Roiling the waters in the Taiwan Strait,” that appeared on this page on March 21.
Beijing apparently wanted to pressure Washington into reining in Taipei. The tactic appeared to work: The Bush administration issued anxious statements and even sent an envoy to Taipei demanding “clarification” after Chen first indicated his intention in late January to abolish the Council.
Since then, Beijing has mounted at least six more moves to win the hearts and minds of Taiwan’s people. That brought to at least 15 the number of such measures since Beijing passed the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005.
They include inviting Taiwanese farmers to sell fruit on Chinese markets, offering scholarships to Taiwanese students in China, providing loans to Taiwanese businessmen, relaxing regulations on Taiwanese professionals seeking work on the mainland and more.
I had the pleasure of hearing Lin speak a few weeks ago at an American Chamber of Commerce event here and left convinced that China is “winning” when it comes to Taiwan and myriad other foreign policy initiatives. He also talked about Hu’s reaching out to the Vatican and to Buddhists as further evidence of China seeking to soften its image in the eyes of a suspicious world. Reconciliation, peace and cooperation is China’s new world order. “Zhongnanhai reached a consensus on how it would deal with the US and other world powers,” Lin said. “The consensus was to make cooperation a priority.”
Even if you think the whole “outreach thing” is bogus and cynical, you have to look at Hu’s diplomacy with a sense of admiration. He knows what he wants for China and he knows how to get it – at least in terms of international relations. Lin went on about what Hu is achieving in Europe, Latin America and Africa and elsewhere, and it reminded me of how the US consolidated its power through brilliant diplomatic maneuvers after both the first and second world wars.
America’s power is in decline and China’s power is on the rise. Unfortunately, that’s not even debatable. That doesn’t mean they are anywhere close to equilibrium; America is still way, way, way higher than China – we’d have to fall a huge distance and China would have to soar to unimaginable (for now) heights before that happens. But the trend is in place, and this really is China’s century.
Just as the 20th Century was America’s, and just as we quietly built global partnerships to ensure our leading position, China, too, is now extending its tentacles into every corner of the globe and making deals designed to guarantee its steady ascension. And they are doing it very well. Americans for generations believed that the Monroe Doctrine guaranteed Latin America would always be under our influence. Sometimes, when that relationship appeared under threat, we didn’t hesitate to send in the troops. That’s changing fast, as more and more nations realize they have to hitch their star to China.
Hu’s string of policy victories in Latin America and Africa, not to mention his incredible success in winning the hearts and minds of his neighbors in Asia, like Singapore, Malaysia and even – who would have ever thought it?- India, is nothing short of miraculous. The same with the European Union; they see China and there are stars in their eyes (or dollar signs) – and Hu has increased China’s influence on the EU more than most of us imagine, according to Lin. “Hu has elevated the imporatance of the EU as a counterweight to the US,” Lin said. “Whenever there is a vacuum of US or European influence, China will fill it, as they are doing in Africa.”
So, back to the title of this post, Two Chinas. This stems from a question I asked Mr. Lin as he described in breathtaking detail the triumphs Hu quietly achieved in terms of foreign policy from 2003 to the present. So this is, in a nutshell, my question to Lin:
Mr. Lin, you are describing foreign policy performed at the very highest levels of sophistication. The way you are describing Hu, one would have to think of him as an uncannily adept, brilliant deal maker and a man of incredible power and persuasion. And yet, at the very moment of some of his most impressive successes in 2003 – at that very instant, China was making some of the greatest domestic blunders in the nation’s history, lying to its own people about SARS, losing their trust and dragging the country into a state of panic and confusion that resulted in the loss of billions of dollars and immeasurable losses in terms of world public opinion. How do we reconcile this? How can we have Hu the super-diplomat in one corner, and in the other corner we have Hu the great bungler who was too stupid to follow the most fundamental rules of crisis control: don’t lie when it’s inevitable you’ll get caught? It’s almost as if you are talking about two Chinas, one that is skillful and incisive and ingenious, another that is hopelessly inept and amateurish and foolish.
The bottom line is this: Lin said this was exactly correct. There are two Chinas and they exist in separate universes. Now, this is not any great revelation. We’ve discussed it here many times, especially in regard to local officials who are free to act at whim with no fear of reprisal or justice, existing literally in a universe apart from The central Party. Lin said the great paradox here is that despite Hu’s awesome power, he is literally helpless to make any changes in China’s domestic situation, only in its foreign policy (which, granted, can then in turn affect China’s domestic situation).
So I’ve been thinking about this paradox all week. Should we admire Hu Jintao as the Bismarck or Metternich of his time, using political skill to achieve enviable results? Or should we laugh at him for being utterly impotent to effect any meaningful change in the country over which he allegedly rules? If he is so utterly incapable of halting corruption, of freeing the innocent, of enforcing the law, of imprisoning unabashed scoundrel and murderers, why does he even live in China? Couldn’t he set up a condo in Bermuda and run China’s foreign policy from there? What difference does it make? According to Lin, he’s literally irrelevant to China’s domestic situation.
What an odd paradox, a leader with so much power, and at the same time a leader with no power at all.
Disclaimer: I am not an expert on China nor have I ever claimed to be. It’s simply a place that interests me and so I blog about it. Nothing that I say here is necessarily “true” (though none of it is intentionally false), and I’m more than willing to be proven wrong about everything, as I frequently am.
On a more mundane note, my home PC is still broken, so this’ll be the last post of the night. This diatribe was written at work, but after working hours (of course).
Update: Just to be clear, Lin believes China is utterly intent on winning Taiwan, no matter how pacifist it makes itself appear. “Hu’s idea is to seize Taiwan as a ravishingly beautiful and smiling bride and to hold her in China’s embrace,” he said. “He intends to win it as he would a shining trophy, which he will then place, undented, on a shelf.”
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