There are striking parallels between China during its period of Nationalist rule (1937-1949) and China under the post-Mao CCP. Or at least that’s the proposed hypothesis of this new story from Time Asia:

In each case, the ruling party could draw support from the living memory of the chaos that preceded its rule: the postimperial warlord era for the nationalists, the Cultural Revolution for the post-Mao communists. But the fundamental question of the basis of a regime’s legitimacy is as pertinent today as it was in the 1930s.

Nationalists and communists alike came to power through military victory, propagating a progressive ideology that was meant to correct the errors of the past. In each case, that ideology was not properly implemented or became outdated. Faced with the immense task of running a country as big and varied as China, Chiang tried to rule by issuing orders. Democracy was not on the agenda. Political power was to be exercised by the sole party on behalf of the people. That created a gulf between his government and those who found themselves kept outside the power structure, just as has been the case in the China that evolved from his defeat after 1949.

At the heart of the argument is how under both regimes, the gulf between the rich and poor widened drastically, making the fall of Chiang a certainty. If it doesn’t have such drastic implications for the CCP (and it certainly hasn’t so far), it will at least mean huge headaches and challenges. And if these aren’t dealt with…. Well, only time will tell. It concludes:

Last week’s Party plenum showed that President Hu Jintao’s administration is aware of the need to be more responsive about China’s social problems—but it skirted the issue of political reform. Unless it tackles that, along with a determined effort to broaden its appeal in ways which address popular concerns, the heirs of the victory of 1949 could find themselves sharing Chiang’s predicament.